Financial liberalization under weak regulation is often followed by …nancial crises. We argue that this may be the deliberate outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process.
Introduction
Financial development appears correlated with subsequent economic growth (Levine, 2004) . Poor …nancial development undermines growth in sectors relying on external …nance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Black and Strahan, 2002) and constrains new entry (Perotti and Volpin, 2004) . While lack of funding is not the sole obstacle for potential entrepreneurs (Johnson et al, 2002) , access to external …nancing provides resources to overcome generic entry barriers.
1 Policies promoting …nancial development, such as better investor protection and liberalization, appear therefore well justi…ed. Better investor protection should increase the availability of external …nance. Liberalization empowers the private sector to allocate capital, which should in turn ensure access to external …nance for all productive projects.
In fact, many …nancial liberalizations are successful. 2 There is no general increase in volatility in consumption following liberalizations, except for countries with poor investor protection or poor accountability (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2004 ). Yet liberalization has had mixed success in developing countries. While it produces rapid expansion in credit (and often foreign investment) with a positive impact on short term economic growth, in many countries it has been followed by severe banking crises in response to external shocks. These crises, often coupled with sharp currency devaluations (as in Mexico, South East Asia, and Russia), in ‡icted massive losses to investors and taxpayers, and contributed to deep recessions. Yet …nancial development should have just strengthened the ability of …rms to resist external shocks. What explains this variation in outcomes ? Speci…cally, when does liberalization lead to …nancial vulnerability ?
Sensible policies seem to fail in the presence of poor institutions (Acemoglu et al, 2003) . Liberalization is more likely to be followed by banking crises in countries with poor institutions or low transparency (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 1999; Keefer, 2001) .
In this paper we argue that poor political institutions lead to capture of the design and implementation of liberalization in response to lobbying pressure. In principle, liberalization should free …nancial institutions from direct political control, and lead to greater access to …nance for better
…rms. Yet market …nancing decisions are still in ‡uenced by the local legal environment, in particular on the enforcement of investor claims.
We model the choice of investor protection as a legislative or enforcement choice taken by politicians. Lobbying by established interests whose dominance is challenged by …nancial development will seek to capture the design of reforms. 3 Speci…cally, richer entrepreneurs lobby for lower investor protection to limit access to …nance and thus entry by poorer entrepreneurs (Perotti and Volpin, 2004) . 4 In our dynamic setting, investor protection a¤ects not only ex ante access to …nance, but also ex post re…nancing after an external shock.Thus even when liberalization increases entry, investor protection may be distorted to ensure excessive exit after an external shock by weaker, more leveraged producers.
2 For a detailed study of how the French banking liberalization in the 1980s improved the allocation of capital while broadening access to …nance, see Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar, 2004. 3 As legislation is not decided directly by voters, median voter models are appropriate to model legislative choices only in highly accountable countries. See Pagano and Volpin, forthcoming; Perotti and von Thadden, 2004; Berglof and Bolton (2003) . 4 Poor investor rights creates incentives to default ex post and thus block …nancing of potentially pro…table projects.
Richer and thus less leveraged entrepreneurs may still be able to credibly promise to repay their loans, and will therefore enjoy access to …nance.
We obtain three distinct policy outcomes, corresponding to di¤erent …nancial "regimes". They lead to di¤erent entry and exit rates, and di¤erent degrees of …nancial fragility. In countries with high democratic accountability 5 , bribing politicians to block entry of poor entrepreneurs is too expensive for the rich. Thus investor protection will be set so as to ensure access for all to …nance and re…nance after a shock. At intermediate levels of accountability, lobbying to block ex ante access is still too costly, but investor protection may be set deliberately low so as to limit access to re…nancing after a shock. This reduces competition for rich producers as the poorer, more leveraged producers are forced to exit. This form of involuntary default is a case of deliberately induced fragility. Finally, when democratic accountability is very weak, the rich …nd it attractive to lobby for very low investor protection so as to block any access by poor entrepreneurs. We term this case a "narrow" …nancial equilibrium.
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There is clear cross country evidence that entry rates are very sensitive to corruption. Perotti and Volpin (2004) show that a higher democracy score is associated with higher entry in sectors more dependent on external capital and those with greater growth opportunities. Also, higher accountability and lower income inequality are associated with more e¤ective investor protection, complementing the role of legal origin.
We next present evidence from a broad panel of industries and countries, adopting Rajan and Zingales's (1998) methodology to control for endogeneity and missing variables at the level of industry and country. Consistent with the model, producer margins during banking crisis are higher for …nancially dependent …rms in countries with worse institutions. Most notably, the e¤ect is strongest when …nancial needs are interacted with measures of corruption. More poignantly, we are able to
show that the e¤ect is correlated with abnormally higher exit rates, precisely the prediction of the model. We are not aware of any study which could explain why there should be relatively more exit in crises in more corrupt countries.
Interestingly, other institutional variables such as the rule of law or other measures of political structure, per se highly correlated with corruption, do not seem to explain pro…t changes or exit rates signi…cantly. This provides more support for corruption as the most important institutional channel, which is consistent with our explanation based on lobbying.
Two other testable implications we have not yet explored are that greater inequality and more volatile shocks should increase …nancial fragility. Interestingly, volatility leads to a fragile regime not because it implies larger losses, but because it reduces expected pro…tability. This increases the incentive by the rich elite to lobby harder for weaker investor protection to protect its rents.
We discuss next the related literature and some related empirical evidence. Section 3 presents 5 We de…ne political accountability as constraints on executive power. 6 We rule out here the case when rich entrepreneurs lobby to be able to default strategically. In Feijen and Perotti (2005) we show that this occurs only under socialization of losses, and in less accountable political systems.
the basic model. Section 4 contains the comparative statics and o¤ers an extension on the impact of domestic default. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
The literature on …nancial crises initially considered crises as the outcome of fundamental macroeconomic unbalances. Second generation models show crises may arise under self-ful…lling expectations (e.g. Chang and Velasco, 1998, and Allen and Gale, 1998) . In the so-called third generation class of …nancial crises models, unbalances arise because of poor incentives due to weak institutions or poor policies (e.g. Krugman (1998), Corsetti et al (1999) ). Our approach is to endogenize the quality of regulatory and legal institutions as a political choice. In our model, poor regulation (and thus …nancial fragility) is deliberately created to capture bene…ts while socializing losses, which potentially can give rise to a liquidity crisis for …rms of poorer entrepreneurs.
A growing body of empirical evidence shows that political and economical elites can manipulate institutions (Glaeser et al, 2003) . Politically powerful interest lobbies in ‡uence the type of property rights protection which suits their interests best (He, Morck and Yeung, 2000) . E¤ective investor protection appears associated with democratic accountability as well as legal origin, even after controlling for economic development (Perotti and Volpin, 2004) . Poor countries, especially the more corrupt ones, tend to have ine¢ ciently high entry barriers, with bureaucrats and politicians as principal bene…ciaries (Djankov et al, 2002 ). Yet Johnson et al (2002) …nd evidence of high marginal returns at a low level of capital investment, as well as tight …nancial constraints for poor individuals.
Incumbents have an incentive to oppose …nancial development because it breeds competition, hence eroding their rents (Rajan and Zingales (2003) ). 7 Claessens and Perotti (2004) observe that most liberalization programs in emerging countries have focused on …nancial deepening rather than on …nancial broadening, e.g. emphasizing the size of capital in ‡ows rather than their di¤usion.
Investor protection is arguably a simple and stealthy barrier to entry. Poor minority protection appears indeed to limit access to …nance particularly for SMEs (Beck et al, 2004) and in …nancially dependent sectors, especially in countries with low accountability (Perotti and Volpin, 2004) .
Political institutions seem to have a …rst order e¤ect on economic and …nancial stability, even after controlling for policy choices (Acemoglu et al (2003) ). Poor transparency and corruption (Mehrez and Kaufman, 1999) , and weak regulatory institutions (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998), increases the probability of a banking crisis after liberalization. Rajan (2004) argues that limited credibility of institutions reduce foreign currency liquidity and leads to crises. Kaminsky 7 Poor political accountability may be in itself the historical consequence of a narrow initial entry, which entrenches a political structure dominated by established interests (Engermann and Sokolo¤, 1997, Acemoglu et al, 2003) .
and Schmukler (2003) show evidence that …nancial liberalization often leads to intensi…ed boombust cycles in the short term, especially in countries with poor law and order. Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that liberalization per se leads to crises. While there exists an unconditional correlation (Tornell et al, 2004) , many liberalization reforms succeed. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004) show that consumption volatility actually decreases with …nancial openness, even in the set of liberalizing developing countries. On the other hand, countries with poor political institutions exhibit increased volatility.
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However, even when liberalization leads to higher average GDP growth, the distribution of gains remains a relevant question to ensure its sustainability. Elites appear to do comparatively well in …nancial distress. In Latin-America, …nancial transfers following banking crises targeted privileged income classes (Halac and Schmukler, 2002) . At the same time, default costs are usually socialized via regressive policies, such as in ‡ationary bailouts and budget cuts which disproportionately hurt weaker social groups as well as median income households (Das and Mohapatra, 2003 (2000) show that a higher concentration of inherited bilionaire wealth in a country has a depressing e¤ect on economic growth. Banking crises appear also to be associated with unchallenged incumbency: they are more common in countries with historically high barriers to entry in banking, even though actual banking sector concentration has a positive direct e¤ect (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003) .
In a dynamic setting, encouraging access to capital for emerging producers is likely to be optimal.
Entry is a critical determinant of economic renewal and enhanced competitiveness. Beck et al (2004) o¤er cross-country evidence on the importance of SME for growth. Johnson, McMillan and Woodru¤ (2002) Our work is also related to Krishnamurty (2000, 2003) , who model an emerging market crisis where …rms with good projects cannot borrow after a productivity shock because a collateral constraint is binding, leading to ine¢ cient shutdown of production capacity. In Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), …rms can overcome a productive shock to the extent that they can mortgage collateral. In our approach, the reliability of collateral is endogenously determined as a political choice.
Our theoretical approach is a lobbying model where consumers are too dispersed to organize themselves (Grossman and Helpmann, 1994) . 12 Lobbying to block entry favors established interests even when competing producers can organize themselves, since policy choices restricting entry produce larger pure rents, and thus more resources for political bribes. The elite can thus lobby to set minority protection low enough such that while their projects are funded, poorer entrepreneurs are not (Perotti and Volpin, 2004 ).
In the paper we treat inequality and accountability as unrelated, yet there are many reasons to expect inequality to reduce accountability. For instance, in highly unequal countries, poorly paid public o¢ cials may be more vulnerable to bribes. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) show that corruption is higher in countries where bureaucrats'income is low relative to manufacturing wages.
The next sections present and solve the basic model, discuss some extensions and o¤er brief conclusions.
3 The Model
Agents and Technology
Consider a small economy where the interest rate is zero. The population has a normalized size of 1 and consists of m < 1 2 entrepreneurs and 1 m consumers. Consumer i has quasi-linear utility
where k i is consumption of the numeraire good (apples) and c i is consumption of the end good (apples pies). The representative consumer is endowed with ! c > 0 apples. For simplicity, entrepreneur j only values consumption of apples with utility
There are two types of entrepreneurs: the rich with mass R and the poor with mass P , so that m R + P . The poor have zero endowment, hence ! P = 0. The rich are endowed with 0 < ! R < 1. Both have identical projects which require an investment of 1 apple and produce 1 apple pie 13 . Hence to fund production, a poor entrepreneur needs to raise 1 apple externally whereas a rich one only needs 1 ! R apples. Alternatively, entrepreneurs can save their endowment in a riskless asset. Consumers can invest only in the riskless asset.
At an intermediate date the state of the economy may su¤er an external shock with probability q 2 (0; 1). In state = s, all projects are a¤ected, and all require an immediate liquidity injection of > 0 to continue production. On the …nal date, the budget constraint of consumer i is for each
where y i is total income.
We assume that all projects have a positive net present value even in case of full production (when the price of apple pies is lowest)
where p(m) is the price of apple pies in case when m entrepreneurs produce.
1 3 Although this technology is discrete, making the production choice continuous does not change the results of the model qualitatively. The intuition is that in the lobby game this will be anticipated by adjusting accordingly.
For consumers and inactive entrepreneurs, their net income equals the return from riskless savings. For an active entrepreneur j her income is pro…ts minus repayment. An entrepreneur who is not re…nanced after the shock has zero income.
The sequence of events, depicted in Figure 1 , is as follows:
At date 1, entrepreneurs form an interest group to lobby politicians.
At date 2, the lobby groups lobby politicians on investor protection . We assume that once is set, it cannot be changed.
At date 3, entrepreneurs decide whether to invest in their project and seek external …nance, banks choose which entrepreneurs to fund, and compete to o¤er debt.
At date 4, the interim stage, a liquidity shock may occur with probability q. In this case all entrepreneurs need some re…nancing equal to . If the bank denies the request, all production is lost and the entrepreneur defaults. The bank seizes the salvage value M .
At the …nal date 5, active entrepreneurs produce, the riskless asset is liquidated, the price p of apple pies is determined in the market, and consumption takes place. Active entrepreneurs choose to default or repay their loans. The promised political contribution is paid.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Financing
All entrepreneurs need some external …nance to fund entry. In case of a shock, additional liquidity is needed to continue production. Entrepreneurs who are able to raise external …nance to start a …rm may or may not be able to obtain additional re…nancing.
In our context, pro…ts can take only two values, so there is no meaningful distinction between debt and equity for active …rms. If a …rm is denied re…nancing, however, its pro…ts are zero and there is a salvage value M , where M < 1, which external …nanciers are able to seize 14 . We accordingly refer to investors as banks contributing loans. 15 In the basic model, we initially assume that all projects are funded by foreign banks.
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1 4 For simplicity, we simply assume that M is always entirely seizable by …nanciers.
1 5 Our results are not a¤ected if we assume that assets under liquidation may also be partially appropriated. In fact, partial appropriation after early default would never emerge as a political demand by lobbysts, since liquidation is ine¢ cient for every type of entrepreneur.
We assume that the NPV of all projects is still positive after a shock , so that re…nancing is always e¢ cient, even when there is full entry
Finally, in order for a bank to be willing to re…nance at least some entrepreneurs after a shock , it must be better to recoup the loan instead of seizing M directly. This requires that the size of the smallest possible loan (i.e. to the rich entrepreneurs) is larger than M
While rich entrepreneurs need to raise an amount 1 ! R , poor entrepreneurs need to raise the entire investment cost of 1. The ability to raise …nancing depends on legal investor protection , which is the fraction of future revenue which can be reliably promised to investors. In other words, an entrepreneur can always appropriate a fraction 1 of pro…ts with no penalty. Thus whenever the debt of an agent is higher than the "collateralizable" fraction of her pro…t p, the bank can expect to receive at most p. The value of is a political choice, taken under the in ‡uence of lobbying, and is exogenous for any individual entrepreneur.
Thus actual repayment depends on whether p is greater or smaller than the amount the entrepreneur has to pay to the bank: If there was no need for re…nancing, banks would be willing to lend entrepreneur j an amount A j against a face value of D j as long as
where p N and p S are the anticipated equilibrium prices in the normal and shock state, respectively.
At the interim stage, in case of a shock , the bank chooses whether to re…nance individual projects, or refuse in which case output is zero and the bank receives the salvage value M . Banks will re…nance a project only if its leverage
Thus if is low enough banks may prefer not to re…nance, since by assumption M < D j .
We denote by A the set of entrepreneurs who receive ex ante …nancing. Set A contains two subsets: Subset N F contains all entrepreneurs who will be refused additional funding in case of a shock . Subset F consists only of entrepreneurs who will receive re…nancing. As we will see, the composition of the two sets are directly a¤ected by the choice over investor protection :
-9 -
The Political System
At date 2 we allow lobbying of politicians on investor protection . We assume politicians set and care about both social welfare W and political contributions L. Social welfare is de…ned as the weighted sum of consumer and entrepreneur utility:
W (1 m) (indirect utility of consumers) + (pro…ts of entrepreneurs).
The utility of politicians is
where can be interpreted as political accountability or the sensitivity of politicians towards bribes.
Both rich and poor are represented by a lobbyist who attempts to in ‡uence the decision on investor protection 2 [0; 1]. We make the standard assumption that consumers are too dispersed to form a lobby.
Once set, investor protection cannot be changed. Lobbyists can commit to paying a political contribution, conditional on the choice of the politicians, and are able to extract a share of the rents obtained from the group of entrepreneurs they represent. However, they cannot commit to reallocate rents inside their their lobby nor can they promise transfers to each other.
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The sequence of the political game is as follows:
Without loss of generality, the lobbyist for the rich makes its o¤er …rst, followed by the lobbyist for the poorer entrepreneurs.
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Politicians choose between either o¤er or the …rst best (maximum welfare) policy.
Product and Financial Market Equilibrium
We solve backwards for a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Product Market Equilibrium
At the …nal date, consumers maximize their utility given by (1), subject to their budget constraint (3). We assume their income ! c is large enough such that each consumer demands some amount of pies. The rest of income is devoted to consumption of apples, so
The supply of pies is equal to the number of producing entrepreneurs n , therefore
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, total demand for pies is (1 m)(a p ) and total supply is n . Hence p (n ) = a n 1 m . The indirect utility of consumer i is given by
We summarize the utility of individual entrepreneurs in 
and after the shock is
To ensure social welfare is increasing in entry, we need that demand for the …nal good is strong enough, .i.e. a 1 + + m 1 m , which is just Condition 1. Hence
Lemma 2 Social welfare is increasing in the number of producing entrepreneurs n.
Proof. We will show that W s is strictly increasing in n s , which immediately gives the result for W n . As long as N F 6 = ?; welfare cannot be optimal, because entrepreneurs prefer re…nance by assumption and consumer indirect utility is increasing in the number of apple pies in the market.
When all entrepreneurs are included in F ,
which is nonnegative by Condition 1.
Financial Market Equilibrium
We restrict attention to the case when a bank would not re…nance an entrepreneur if the bank anticipates strategic default (as opposed to involuntary default)
This condition ensures that the bank prefers the salvage value M over the seizable value p S minus the opportunity cost if entrepreneur j has an incentive to default strategically.
Condition 5 D j p(m) for any …nanced entrepreneur j.
The ability to obtain …nance depends on investor protection . All entrepreneurs need to raise some initial funding at date 3, and, contingent on a shock, for re…nancing at date 4. In the normal state, all entrepreneurs who were able to start a …rm, produce an apple pie. With no loss of generality, entrepreneurs invest all their wealth in the project, so after a shock they all need re…nancing to produce. Consider the re…nancing decision after a shock, and recall that all entrepreneurs prefer to re…-nance. 21 Entrepreneur j will not be re…nanced when
The LHS is the amount entrepreneur j can credibly promise to repay. The RHS represents the payo¤ for the bank if it seizes the salvage value M .
If is su¢ ciently small such that j has an incentive to default when all entrepreneurs would produce, i.e. p(m) = (a m 1 m ) < D j + , and (10) is satis…ed, the bank refuses to re…nance j, who is forced into liquidation. This occurs when
since by assumption 1 ! j > M for all j. This leads to a …rst general result 1 9 We solve explicitly below for these restrictions in the di¤erent equilibria.
2 0 Rich entrepreneurs may choose to borrow more in order to retain su¢ cient capital to produce after a shock. In equilibrium, this is not necessary, since investor protection is always set such that rich entrepreneurs are re…nanced.
The intuition is that the rich lobby would always seek re…nancing for the rich. Even if investor protection is such that also poor entrepreneurs can be re…nanced, then rich ones certainly can.
2 1 This is always true under the assumption that welfare is increasing in entry.
Lemma 3 Some entrepreneurs will be not re…nanced if < and all will be otherwise.
Thus in a shock state, full entry is not an equilibrium if the enforceable payment from re…nancing is less than the salvage value, in which case only some entrepreneurs are active after a shock. Rich and poor entrepreneurs are equally e¢ cient, but the poor have higher leverage, and this undermines their ability to commit to a full repayment. If instead (10) is not satis…ed for poor entrepreneurs, it will also not be satis…ed by the rich, less leveraged …rms, in which case, all entrepreneurs are re…nanced, and equilibrium pro…ts equal p(m). In contrast, if only less leveraged entrepreneurs satisfy (10), then they are forced to exit and pro…ts will be p(
Since leverage is decreasing in the amount of own capital, there are values of such that poorer entrepreneurs are not re…nanced, while richer entrepreneurs are. When < , the poor are not re…nanced because they would default ex post. The rich, who are less leveraged, would not default after the exit of the poor, as long as D R + p( R ). If this condition is satis…ed, loans to rich entrepreneurs are riskless. As they borrow D R = 1 ! R , the su¢ cient condition for the rich not to have an incentive to default becomes
The greater ability by the rich to promise a return to lenders arise from two e¤ects. First, there are two components to their lower leverage: they have more money of their own and they do not pay a default premium, since they can commit not to default. Second, they can fund themselves at a lower when pro…ts are higher (since p(m) < p( R )), because highly leveraged …rms exit.
The bank will re…nance rich entrepreneurs when satis…es 8 > < > :
conditional on them receiving funding in the …rst place.
Date 3: Funding of Initial Investment
We …rst look at the case when all entrepreneurs are re…nanced, i.e. and . Since by assumption, there is no voluntary default, the condition for initial funding for entrepreneur j is
where D P = 1 and D R = 1 ! R .
Now we shift attention to the case where some entrepreneurs are not re…nanced. If an entrepreneur who will not be re…nanced is able to raise the necessary amount 1 ! j to start a …rm, the face value of her loan is determined by competition to be 1 ! j = qM + (1 q)D j , which implies
The banks will lend to entrepreneurs in set N F to start a …rm only if
The RHS represents the payo¤ to the bank if entrepreneur j would always default.
For poor entrepreneurs this implies that satis…es
In conclusion, poor entrepreneurs can obtain ex ante …nance if satis…es 8 > < > :
In this basic setting where entrepreneurs always repay if they are re…nanced, rich entrepreneurs will be able to raise the amount they need to start a …rm, 1 ! R , as long as and
Thus there are three possible …nancial market allocations, which are shown in Table 2 .
Broad f R ; P g f R ; P g ? Table 2 : Possible …nancial market allocations Table 3 gives an overview of the range of values of for which the di¤erent …nancial allocations emerge. Three di¤erent …nancial market outcomes may arise, depending on the scope of ex ante and ex post access to …nance. In a "narrow" …nancial allocation, the poor cannot raise initial funding nor re…nance, while the rich can. In a "fragile" …nancial allocation, both rich and poor raise …nance to enter, but only the rich are able to get re…nancing after a shock. In a "broad" …nancial allocation all entrepreneurs are able to raise …nance and to be re…nanced if necessary.
Notice that entry …nancing can be obtained in general at lower values of than re…nancing, except in a fragile allocation, when exit by the poor ensures higher pro…ts for the rich and thus may allow re…nancing at a lower than the initial funding.
2 2 We do not describe the case when the rich are denied funding either ex ante or ex post (such as when < ),
as they are strictly dominated equilibria which will be eliminated by the endogenous choice of . The intuition is that there are no values of such that they would be funded while the rich are not.
Rich
Initial funding ( ) Default after shock ( )
Poor Initial funding ( ) Default after shock ( Note also that for the rich in a Narrow or Broad …nancial allocation, entry implies re…nancing, so < . Moreover, for the poor re…nancing requires them to have no incentive to default, so
Summarizing,
Proposition 1 A Narrow …nancial market …nancial allocation arises only if < minf ;
the Fragile …nancial allocation arises only if maxf ; ;
and the Broad …nancial allocation arises only if
These parameter regions are not overlapping.
Intuitively, has to be higher to allow broader ex ante access and lower to reduce access to re…nancing. Thus is highest in the Broad …nancial allocation, intermediate in the Fragile, and lowest in the Narrow.
Parameter regions for the Broad allocation always exist under the assumption that projects have positive NPV, i.e. p(m) > 1 + . Henceforth we assume that parameters are such that the Narrow and Fragile allocations are both attainable by an appropriate choice of .
Lobby Equilibrium
The lobbyists formulate their o¤er to maximize the net rent generated for their constituency, namely by seeking to ensure entry for all its members. Ensuring access to funding for the poor also guarantees access for richer entrepreneurs, who need less. Thus the lobbyist for the poor entrepreneurs supports a welfare-maximizing full entry, or + = 1+ p(m) , which ensures funding and re…nancing for all entrepreneurs. The rich lobby needs to make a better o¤er, else broad access prevails.
The lobbyist which maximizes the rents for the rich prefers narrow over broad entry, and in case of a shock , prefers a fragile over a broad allocation of funding (i.e., no re…nancing for the poor who are then forced to exit). To these goals, the rich lobby o¤ers a political contribution such that the politicians are just indi¤erent to accept their proposed L over the proposal of the other lobbyist.
The required contribution the rich have to pay, E[L R ( L )], needs to compensate for the loss in welfare relative to the social optimum of full entry, when n = m in all states, given by
where
. In addition they must pay the contribution that the lobby of poor entrepreneurs is willing to pay for access, which at most can amount to their entire surplus from production.
is decreasing in L , because welfare is increasing in n, which in turn is increasing in . Hence limiting access requires higher bribes.
First consider the expected pay o¤ of the rich in a Narrow …nancial allocation
The …rst term are rents under narrow entry, the second term is the lobby compensation for the amount the poor are willing to o¤er, and the third term is the expected political contribution needed to compensate for the welfare loss from reduced entry.
The expected pro…t of the rich in case of a Fragile …nancial allocation is
] is the lobby contribution in the shock state.
The expected pro…t of the rich in case of a Broad …nancial allocation is
The rich lobbyist chooses its o¤er to induce the preferred which maximizes its expected rents.
Hence we need to pairwise compare these three expressions. The key determinants are political accountability, , and the mass of the rich, R .
Therefore we rewrite the inequalities such that 1 is a function of R . Note that 1 is strictly increasing in . Comparing the payo¤s of the Broad and the Narrow …nancial allocation gives
This inequality compares the two polar allocations, where access to …nance is either complete or most restrictive. Here (p Narrow p Broad ) is the di¤erence in pro…t between the two equilibria 23 ,
is the compensentation necessary to match the expected amount the poor are willing to o¤er to obtain full access to …nance, and
is the expected amount to compensate for the welfare loss due to narrow entry.
Notice that the numerator represents the pro…t di¤erence minus the amount for the poor per poor individual. The denominator is the political contribution per poor individual. Note that the former is increasing in R , the latter is decreasing in R .
Comparing the rich lobby's payo¤ in the Fragile and Narrow equilibria yields
Here (p Narrow p Broad ) is the pro…t di¤erence in the Narrow and the Broad allocation, which the rich enjoy with probability 1 q.
(Poor) N = P (p(m) 1) is the amount the poor are willing to pay the politicians in the normal state.
(Contribution Welfare Loss)
] is the amount the rich have to pay in the normal state to compensate for the welfare loss of limited entry. Note the interpretation of the numerator and denominator is analogous to (26). Because pay o¤s in these two equilibria only di¤er in the normal state, the inequality is invariant to .
The following inequality compares the pay o¤ to the rich across equilibria whose access to …nance for the poor is limited only after a shock . Hence this inequality is invariant to q.
The interpretation of terms is similar to the previous equation, while now the contribution o¤ered by the poor lobby is P (p(m) 1). Note that this inequality is invariant with respect to q.
These three inequalities de…ne three parameter regions for and R , depicted in Figure 2 :This leads to our main result.
Proposition 2 When BF ; the political equilibrium leads to a broad …nancial regime. When F N < < BF ; the political equilibrium is a fragile …nancial regime. When ; the political equilibrium is a narrow …nancial regime.
The proof is immediate from evaluating the net gain for the rich lobby to pursue their preferred …nancial allocation. From our analysis in this section, it is evident that F N < BN <
BF
Moreover, note that for 1 around BN ; the rich strictly prefer the Fragile allocation. Therefore F N and BF are the two relevant thresholds which determine the lobbying outcome.
In conclusion, accountability determines what the rich may need to pay to obtain their preferred level of investor protection, and thus the …nancial regime.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Comparative Statics and Extensions
The previous section established that accountability is the critical factor in determining …nancial access and the degree of …nancial stability. A higher political accountability increases the lobbying contribution needed to limit entry or force exit. Beyond some threshold, it discourages lobbying altogether, resulting in an e¢ cient …nancial market which is both stable and grants broad …nancial access, leading to maximum entry.
A direct empirical implication is that the least accountable countries will have very low investor protection, and thus less …nancial development. This result is derived and con…rmed empirically in Perotti and Volpin (2004) . Our contribution is to extend the result to …nancial stability (or equivalently, to include both entry and exit). A reliable …nancial system, de…ned as a system which limits ine¢ cient default after external shocks, will arise only when political accountability is su¢ ciently large to discourage lobbying for …nancial fragility in order to force exit.
We consider next the e¤ect of the other major variables, namely wealth inequality, demand and volatility of shocks.
To consider the impact of inequality we assume, very realistically, that there are more poor than rich, so that R < P :The standard measure of wealth inequality, the Gini coe¢ cient, in our setup is the di¤erence between average wealth and median wealth: If we limit attention to inequality among entrepreneurs, which is where it plays a role, the Gini coe¢ cient equals m R ! R 24 . Thus inequality increases either as the mass of rich agents R increases (as long as it remains smaller than P ), or as ! R increases. Examining F N and BF , we …nd that Lemma 4 Ceteris paribus, a Narrow entry equilibrium requires that the rich be su¢ ciently numerous. The minimum size of the rich block to sustain a Narrow equilibrium is increasing in accountability.
The intuition is that limiting entry to a small elite imposes high welfare losses. A similar result may be stated concerning the ability of the rich lobby to create fragility in a …nancial system which allows broad entry.
We consider now the other component of inequality, namely the wealth of the rich. A …rst e¤ect of a larger ! R is that the di¤erential in leverage between rich and poor increases. From our earlier results, this implies that it is easier to exclude the poor from …nancial access via a lower degree of protection (e.g., it makes it easier to achieve a narrow equilibrium, as the higher investor protection required to ensure re…nancing of rich entrepreneurs does not imply entry by poor entrepreneurs).
A second e¤ect, described in the previous lemma, is that a larger R reduces the cost of blocking further entry as output by rich entrepreneurs is larger. 25 Therefore, we obtain Proposition 3 For a given level of accountability, the larger is wealth inequality, the easier it is for the rich to block access to …nance for other groups, as long as the poor are more numerous than the rich.
The proof is by inspection of the conditions F N and BF :
This coincides with the …ndings in Perotti and Volpin (2004) . They show that in a cross-section 2 4 If we include consumers, the Gini coe¢ cient equals m R ! R (1 m)! C , which is monotonous in the measure we use, provided that ! R > ! C .
2 5 In Perotti-Volpin (2004), the endogenous size of the elite increases with accountability.
of 38 countries, both higher accountability and lower income inequality are associated with better e¤ective investor protection, even after controlling for legal origin and per-capita income.
The comparative statics for the impact of the level of demand and volatility of shocks on the size of the parameter space of the three equilibria are summarized in Table 3 . In the …rst place, an increase in a, i.e. an increase in demand for the …nal good, increases, ceteris paribus, the NPV of production. At the same time, since consumers value the good more highly, their welfare is reduced more by lower entry. As a result, the cost to lobby for limited access is increasing in a. Thus
Proposition 4
Higher demand leads to a downward shift of BF and N F ; reducing the area of the fragile equilibrium.
Formally, BF and N F both decrease in a, but BF decreases faster in a than N F .
The volatility of external shocks in our setting can be decomposed in the probability of a shock and its size. An intuitive result, which however arises for surprising reasons, is that larger shocks are associated with greater …nancial fragility. The reason is not that they imply larger losses:
since re…nancing all projects remains e¢ cient, appropriate investor protection would still ensure re…nancing and thus rule out default. Rather, larger shocks create fragility because they reduce the value of production but, unlike lower demand, do not a¤ect welfare. As a result, shocks a¤ects rents but do not a¤ect lobbying costs, nor the political demand for bribes. Therefore
Proposition 5 Larger shocks induce stronger lobbying contributions to limit entry and, when entry cannot be blocked, to force exit via greater …nancial fragility.
Finally, we consider the e¤ect of a mean-preserving spread in external shocks, by increasing while keeping q constant. The result is consistent with the previous lemma: a mean-preserving increase in volatility a¤ects only BF , and so enlarges the region of …nancial fragility. Once again, this increase in fragility does not result from the inability of …rms to compensate for the shock .
Rather, it arises from the increased willingness of the rich lobby to expend resources to block entry to compensate for the lower expected rents.
Domestic Funding and Welfare Costs of Default
In this section we relax the assumption that default losses do not a¤ect welfare because they are solely born by foreign capital.
We extend the basic model to the case where endowments of domestic investors are used to fund projects. We simplify by assuming that default costs are born fully by some domestic investors in which case the entire endowment of these a¤ected agents is used to partially compensate investors)
or a equal distribution of default losses, which have the same e¤ect on aggregate welfare. Formally, concentrated losses have a smoother impact on demand for the …nal good, while an equal distribution of losses a¤ects demand only when losses are large enough, and thus creates a discontinuity. Since the results are qualitatively similar, we focus here on the technically simpler concentrated case.
The main e¤ect is that it becomes more expensive to lobby for the Fragile equilibrium, hence the Broad and Narrow equilibria become more attractive relative to the Fragile equilibrium. The introduction of welfare losses caused by demand drops does not change the relative attractiveness of the Broad versus the Narrow equilibrium, because demand is not a¤ected in both equilibria. Hence the curves shift as depicted in Figure 3 .
[Insert Figure 3 here] Formally, assume that idle domestic agents (consumers and inactive entrepreneurs) can only deposit their endowment in the bank 26 . In case of a shock we assume a randomly chosen fraction
of these domestic agents lose their total endowment and have zero income. The fraction in the equation represents the ratio of the size of the initial loans to the entrepreneurs who will not be …nanced over total endowments of idle agents. In this case, total demand for apple pies shrinks.
Total default costs born by the a¤ected consumers equal
. Therefore after a shock, demand drops to
where c
represents the mass of consumers who bear the default costs and hence have zero demand for apple pies. So in equilibrium, the price in the shock state is
2 6 Note this implies that these consumers are not able to demand a default premium to compensate them for utility loss of the shock state in the normal state. Hence the equilibria curves in Figure 2 will not change. The only e¤ect is that consumers will demand a higher default premium than foreigners.
Notice this inequality coincides with its counterpart in the basic model when c = 0.
There are two e¤ects at work. Demand drops, so the pro…t di¤erence between the two equilibria is reduced. This reduces the incentive to lobby for fragility. Furthermore, the political contribution required to restrict re…nance increases because welfare is also reduced by the default costs.
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Hence, the larger is the domestically funded share of investment costs, the less likely is a Fragile …nancial allocation relative to the Broad allocation.
] also changes. In the shock state, the di¤erence between the Fragile and Narrow equilibria is
which represents the di¤erences in pro…t and the political contribution. Thus the Fragile equilibrium becomes less attractive. In the normal state, this di¤erence is as in the basic model, so we get
Note that this inequality collapses to its counterpart in the basic model for c = 0.Notice that defaults occur only in the fragile …nancial allocation. Hence there is now a welfare loss through demand in a fragile equilibrium, while the other equilibria are una¤ected.
Proposition 6 Welfare losses associated with default reduces the parameter space for which a fragile …nancial equilibrium emerges.
Intuitively, welfare su¤ers from default in a fragile equilibrium, so it is more expensive to lobby for fragility.
The proof is that pro…ts after a shock are now lower, as demand drops by c = C P !c , the mass of consumers who bear the default cost. Thus the introduction of domestic funding of losses a¤ects the relative payo¤ for the rich lobby between stable and fragile …nancial allocations.
Empirical Evidence
This section brie ‡y explores the empirical evidence of the theory put forth in this paper. It presents the basic results of the empirical work in Feijen (2005) . If …nancial access is used as an opportunistic barrier to re…nance during crises, our theory implies relatively larger exit in industries which are heavily dependent on external …nance in countries with a high level of corruption (i.e. low ).
More generally, as a consequence of exit and curtailed access to …nance for young …rms, we expect that price-cost margins during banking crises are relatively higher in industries which are heavily dependent on external …nance in countries with a high level of corruption. Feijen (2005) employs a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) Tables I (for margins) and II (on number of producers).
[Insert Table I and Table II here] 2 8 This methodology is similar to Laeven et al (2002) .
In Table I , the interaction term with corruption is negative and signi…cant at the 1% level, implying that margins are relatively higher in dependent industries of corrupt countries. Also the interaction with the average institutional index is signi…cant. Note ST ART .Y i;c is also highly signi…cant, suggesting that the margin drops deeper when margins were already high.
Similarly, in Table II , only the interaction term with corruption is positive and signi…cant at the 5% level, implying that there is relatively more exit in dependent industries of corrupt countries.
Interestingly, interactions with other institutional variables -although correlated with corruptionin both Table I and II do not enter signi…cantly. This provides more support for corruption as the most important institutional channel,which is consistent with our theory of lobbying.
Next, we document that the e¤ect in Table I is non-linear and more important for highly corrupt countries. Table III presents the results.
[Insert Table III here]
Model (1) and (2) run the basic regression for the most and least corrupt countries, respectively.
The interaction term is only signi…cant for the most corrupt countries. Model (3) adds an interaction term with a squared corruption index. Both interaction terms are signi…cant and suggest the e¤ect ‡attens for a low level of the corruption index. Models (4)- (6) show the results of quantile regressions for the 10, 50, and, 90 percent quantiles of the dependent variable, respectively. 29 Note that indeed the coe¢ cient of the interaction term almost doubles for the countries with the highest PCMs.
Finally, we test an alternative measure of …nancial constraints than external dependence using industry-level opaqueness measures computed from US data. This measure is based on the methodology of Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) , which exploits the notion that a higher ratio of industry-level stock price comovement to idiosyncratic volatility of individual shares indicates a lower capacity by investors to perceive …orm speci…c information. Durnev et al. (2004) argue that more opaque industries are more vulnerable to agency costs. Lower values of the information index imply less informative stock prices. Therefore, we expect the interaction term to be positive for the change in PCM, but negative for the change in EST. Table IV indeed provide support for this hypothesis.
[Insert Table IV here]
The coe¢ cients imply that less informative industries in more corrupt countries experience relatively higher pro…t margins and higher exit rates during crises.
We have o¤ered a political economy theory on …nancial fragility, in which vulnerability to shocks may be a deliberate choice when policy is captured by special interests under an unequal wealth distribution.
A politically induced vulnerability arises because lobbying by powerful groups, particularly strong in a context of poor accountability and large inequality, will be directed to limit access to …nance by competing producers. Even when the broadening of …nancial access cannot be blocked by the powerful, they may still lobby to induce a suboptimal level of investor protection to reduce access after a shock, and forcing exit. Even in a market based …nancial allocation, it is possible to force exit by poorer entrepreneurs after a crisis, since their …rms are more leveraged. and access to …nance is therefore more vulnerable in a climate of poor investor protection. This leads to ine¢ cient, avoidable default.
In related work (Feijen and Perotti, 2005) , we study a distinct form of politically induced …-nancial vulnerability. This arises when government guarantees to investors create an incentive for entrepreneurs to default strategically. 30 Since strategic default may be feasible only in equilibria with blocked or fragile entry, it is more likely to emerge in less politically accountable systems.
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We show that economies which are subject to more volatile shocks (such as commodity economies) are more likely to end up in a fragile equilibrium, because volatility reduces rents and thus induces stronger lobbying for fragility. Hence volatile commodity prices may induce …nancial crises not just directly, but also via an endogenous political vulnerability.
The paper has implications for economic policy. Financial development is at serious risk of capture in unequal countries with unaccountable political regimes. In such contexts, policies aimed at …nancial broadening are more justi…ed than market deepening measures. In addition, special attention should be given to re…nancing opportunities, especially for smaller …rms. The ultimate goal should be to improve investor protection so as to provide a level playing …eld and equalize opportunities for less rich but (at least) equally talented individuals.
3 0 See Krugman (1998) for a similar argument to explain the Asian crisis. The dashed line shifts to the middle for larger . Zingales, 1998) with pre-crisis country-level measures of 1) private credit via banks to GDP (WDI),
2) corruption (higher value means higher corruption, ICRG), 3) law and order (higher value means better law and order, ICRG), and 4) an simple average of these indices (where a higher value means better institutions). *, **, *** indicate signi…cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
